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I. Wittgenstein, the Reader of James
1 William James is one of the authors most cited and referred to in the writings that
Wittgenstein left at his death,1 despite which it is only recently that scholars of the
Austrian philosopher have devoted themselves to the analysis of the relation of their
respective thoughts. Russell B. Goodman, one of the pioneers in this task, describes the
stage of Wittgensteinian hermeneutics prior to his own work:
Some  of  the  best  commentators  on  the  Investigations […]  ignore  Wittgenstein’s
references  to  James  entirely.  Others  who  notice  James’  influence  […]  see
Wittgenstein not as having learned from James, but as predominantly critical of
him. (Goodman 2002: 62)
2 Well, it can now be said that this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s attitude to James as
“merely critical and negative”2 is no longer tenable. It is evident that Wittgenstein did
not only disagree with the American thinker but also accepted many of his points of
view. And not only those expressed in The Varieties of Religious Experience, one of James’s
books of which Wittgenstein always spoke enthusiastically,3 but also in The Principles of
Psychology, the book that at one time he thought of using as a “target” for his criticisms
in his classes.4
3 Moreover,  although  it  is  very  plausible  to  think  that  some  of  the  most  profound
assumptions of the philosophical tradition when it discusses the nature of the mental –
such as  the possibility  of  the existence of  a  private  language –  which Wittgenstein
destroys were considered by him as implied by the introspective method that James
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recommended and practised in his Principles,5 it is no less true that other criticisms that
Wittgenstein directs at the American thinker seem to be off the mark or to be simply
unfair.
4 Let’s take two examples that will concern us especially: Wittgenstein’s criticism of the
supposed scientific status of James’s psychology, and his criticism of the conception of
the self that the author of The Principles assumes.
5 In Manuscript 165 of the Nachlass Wittgenstein wrote:
How  necessary  is  the  work  of  philosophy  is  shown  by  James’s  Psychology.
Psychology, he says, is a science. But he discusses almost no scientific questions. His
movements are merely attempts to free himself from the cobwebs of metaphysics in
which he is caught. He cannot yet walk, or fly at all, he only wriggles: not that that
is not interesting. Only it is not a scientific activity. (Wittgenstein 2000: MS 165:
150-1)
6 Wittgenstein is quite right, as even James would willingly have conceded. At least if we
take account of the confession that he makes to Holt, the publisher of his Principles, to
whom he describes his work in the following terms:
a loathsome, distended, tumefied, bloated, dropsical mass, testifying to nothing but
two facts: 1st, that there is no such thing as a science of psychology, and 2nd, that
W. J. is an incapable. (James 1926: 393-4)
7 and in the epilogue of his abbreviated version of the Principles he adds:
This is no science, it is only the hope of a science. The matter of a science is with us
[…] at present psychology is in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws
of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all
reactions. The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psychology will be famous men indeed
when they come, as come they some day surely will, or past successes are no index
to the future. (James 1892b: 468)
8 However, may not these words of James’s be at the origin of Wittgenstein’s reflection
that practically concludes the fragment of philosophy of psychology published as the
second part of his Investigations? Remember:
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by its being a
“young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its
beginnings. (Rather, with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For
in psychology, there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the
other  case,  conceptual  confusion  and  methods  of  proof.)  The  existence  of  the
experimental method makes us think that we have the means of getting rid of the
problems  which  trouble  us;  but  problem  and  method  pass  one  another  by.
(Wittgenstein 2009: II, XIV, 371)
9 It does not seem to be a far-fetched hypothesis. And what seems to follow from it is that
both James and Wittgenstein might agree in pointing to the limitations of psychology
as  science,  but  whereas,  according  to  Wittgenstein,  James  would  conceive  those
limitations  as  being  merely  empirical,  he  himself  would  understand them as  being
basically conceptual. Now, would this interpretation be fair to James? I suspect not.
10 At the very beginning of Chapter VI of his Principles, we read:
The reader who found himself  swamped with too much metaphysics in the last
chapter  will  have  a  still  worse  time  of  it  in  this  one,  which  is  exclusively
metaphysical.  Metaphysics  means  nothing  but  an  unusually  obstinate  effort  to
think clearly. The fundamental conceptions of psychology are practically very clear
to us, but theoretically they are very confused, and one easily makes the obscurest
assumptions  in  this  science  without  realizing,  until  challenged,  what  internal
difficulties they involve. When these assumptions have once established themselves
Psychologism and the Self
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
2
(as they have a way of doing in our very descriptions of the phenomenal facts) it is
almost impossible to get rid of them afterwards or to make anyone see that they are
not essential features of the subject.  The only way to prevent this disaster is to
scrutinize  them  beforehand  and  make  them  give  an  articulate  account  of
themselves before letting them pass. (James 1983: 148)6
11 If I refer to this text of James’s it is not with a view to specifying how he understood the
relations between psychology and philosophy (a matter to which we shall return later),
7 but to show that any mere accusation of his having ignored the conceptual problems
that the former entails – and that the latter seeks to clarify – is simply wide of the
mark. James would be completely in agreement with Wittgenstein that “in psychology,
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion” (original emphasis); what is
more,  like  Wittgenstein he would consider  that  the main source of  this  conceptual
confusion  must  be  attributed  to  the  structure  of  our  language,8 and  that  it  is  not
dissolved by the mere application of experimental methods. And he would also agree
that his Principles are not basically the result of application of the experimental method
–  we  have  already  drawn  attention  to  the  preponderance  in  him  of  introspective
observation  and  the  comparative  method  –  and  that  they  contain  a  good  deal  of
“metaphysics.”9
12 Let’s look briefly at the other example that we promised to consider. In §143 of the first
part of the Philosophical Investigations we read:
Here we have a case of introspection, not unlike that which gave William James the
idea that the “self” consisted mainly of “peculiar motions in the head and between
the head and throat.” And James’s introspection showed, not the meaning of the
word  “self”  (so  far  as  it  means  something  like  “person,”  “human  being,”  “he
himself,”  “I  myself”),  or  any  analysis  of  such  a  being,  but  the  state  of  a
philosopher’s attention when he says the word “self” to himself and tries to analyse
its meaning. (And much could be learned from this.) (Wittgenstein 2009: § 143)
13 The passage to which Wittgenstein refers appears in Chapter X of The Principles, and
what it says is this:
In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at least, the “Self of selves,”
when  carefully  examined,  is  found  to  consist  mainly  of  the  collection  of  these  peculiar
motions in the head or between the head and throat. (James 1983: 288; original emphasis)
14 In this passage, is James trying to use introspection to analyse the meaning of the word
“self”? Might this be his objective in this chapter of his book? Without needing to apply
any interpretative charity, the answer to both questions is clearly in the negative.
15 In the passage to which Wittgenstein refers, situated in the context of his discussion of
“The Spiritual Self” (one of the three constituents of “The Empirical Self of Me,” the
other two being “The Material Self” and “The Social Self”),10 what James wants is to
point  out  that  the  “feeling”  that  corresponds  to  our  spiritual  activity  really
corresponds to bodily activities that are generally unnoticed, as the continuation of the
passage makes quite clear:
I  do not  for  a  moment say that  this  is  all it  consists  of,  for  I  fully  realize  how
desperately  hard  is  introspection  in  this  field.  But  I  feel  quite  sure  that  these
cephalic  motions are the portions of  my innermost  activity  of  which I  am most
distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like
unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, it would follow that our entire
feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of
bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked. (original emphasis)
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16 And with regard to the long and complex chapter – the second longest in the book11 – in
which  this  passage  appears,  its  very  title,  “The  consciousness  of  Self,”  shows  that
James’s interest is  not in the meaning of the word “Self” but in what it  is  and the
awareness of it that we may have.
17 In other words,  Wittgenstein seems to be attributing to James the aims of  his  own
grammatical investigation and going on to point out James’s mistakes – but James did
not have those aims, for the simple reason that he did not conceive his investigation as
grammatical.
18 The conclusion to which I wish to come with the mere analysis of these two examples is
that  the  relation  between  James’s  and  Wittgenstein’s  points  of  view  is  extremely
complex; and that, of course, justice is not done to it if all that is said is that the latter is
a critic of the former. The philosophy of the late Wittgenstein may certainly represent
a criticism of some of the central assumptions of James’s psychology, but it is no less
true that Wittgenstein sometimes agrees with James – even when he seems to criticise
him – and sometimes the Austrian uses the American thinker for purposes that were
quite foreign to him.
19 In any case, Wittgensteinian hermeneutics has changed and there are many scholars
who no longer consider that the relation between these two thinkers is merely critical
and  negative;12 yet  it  is  equally  true  that  the  comparison  of  their  respective
philosophies of psychology – as opposed to their positions in philosophy of religion –
has  been  confined  to  the  so-called  second  Wittgenstein.  However,  we  believe  that
extending the comparison to the first Wittgenstein may prove enlightening, and it is to
this task that we are going to devote ourselves in the remaining pages, concentrating
our interest on two questions that are undoubtedly central in the thinking of both men:
psychologism and the understanding of the self.
 
II. Theory of Knowledge and Philosophy of Psychology
20 As I have just noted, there is no lack of reasons for confining the comparison of their
respective philosophies to the second Wittgenstein. James is referred to in the Nachlass
for the first time in a manuscript of 1932, and for the last time in one of 1950-51. If the
comparison  of  their  respective  philosophies  of  religion  is  extended  to  the  first
Wittgenstein it is because it is documentarily justified, for, in a letter of 22 June 1912
addressed  to  Russell,  Wittgenstein  informs  him  that  he  is  reading  The  Varieties  of
Religious Experience, a book that is doing him “a lot of good.”13
21 Now, in the same letter Wittgenstein informs Russell of the discussion that he had had
“with Myers about the relations between Logic and Psychology.”14 So from this letter
we can be sure of two things: 1) that by 1912 Wittgenstein was interested in James, and
2) that he was concerned about the relation between logic and psychology. If this is so,
however,  is  it  implausible  to  think  that  he  then  read,  however  fragmentarily,  the
Principles or the Briefer  Course (remembering that the epilogue of this latter book is
precisely about the relation between philosophy and psychology)?
22 As I  understand it,  this  hypothesis  gains  plausibility  if  we take another factor  into
account: the relation that his mentor in Cambridge at that time, i.e. Bertrand Russell,
had with pragmatism in general and with James in particular.
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23 Indeed,  in  1908  Russell  had  begun  his  critical  dialogue  with  the  pragmatist
philosophers,  and most  especially  with the American philosopher,15 and in  1913 he
began writing a Theory of Knowledge16 in which one of his main aims was to criticise
James’s conception of them, a project from which he finally desisted precisely because
of the criticism to which Wittgenstein subjected the manuscript that Russell gave him
to read.
24 In any case, what we are going to argue now does not depend at all on the validity of
this hypothesis, for all that we are going to defend and try to show is that some of the
theses contained in James’s psychological works may help to cast light on some of the
positions maintained by the young Wittgenstein, starting with the early understanding
that he had of the theory of knowledge.
25 In  the first  work in  which Wittgenstein expressed his  own philosophical  ideas,  the
“Notes on Logic,”17 we find:
Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its basis. Epistemology is the
philosophy of psychology. [Cf. 4.1121.] (Wittgenstein 1998: 106)
26 This passage from the “Notes on Logic” raises many questions, to two of which we wish
to draw attention here. On the one hand, if epistemology is considered equivalent to
the  philosophy of  psychology,  why  is  philosophy  said  to  consist  only  of  logic  and
metaphysics? Should not Wittgenstein have at least added epistemology as one of the
disciplines that form part of philosophy? On the other hand, and perhaps more serious,
what is the basis for such an identification? For, after all, as Wittgenstein could not fail
to be aware, not all psychological states seem, prima facie, to have cognitive value,18 so
it  would appear that  a  broader field  of  problems corresponds to  the philosophy of
psychology than to the theory of knowledge.
27 Well, it is precisely at this point that we can begin to see how the comparison of James’s
theses about Psychology may help us to attain a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s
points  of  view.  At  one  point,  arguing  against  the  existence  of  unconscious  mental
states, James notes:
It is the destiny of thought that, on the whole, our early ideas are superseded by
later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same realities. But none the less do the
earlier and the later ideas preserve their own several substantive identities as so
many several successive states of mind. To believe the contrary would make any
definite science of psychology impossible. The only identity to be found among our
successive ideas is their similarity of cognitive or representative function as dealing
with the same objects. (James 1983: 175-6)
28 What we are interested in in this passage is that at the end of it James attributes to
successive states of mind that pass along the “stream” of our “thought” – here referred
to as “ideas” – a cognitive or representative function that consists in their “dealing”
with objects.19 Or, expressed in other terms, that James attributes to every mental state,
or “psychic fact” (as he sometimes calls them), a cognitive character by virtue of its
intentional nature. Something that, by the way, Russell also does. In fact, where James
speaks of a “cognitive or representative function” the English philosopher speaks of the
relation of “acquaintance” with its objects as a distinctive feature of the mental.20
29 Well, if we consider this cognitive conception of the mental, which was first assumed by
James and then developed by Russell, as the background against which the thought of
the young Wittgenstein moves, I think that light is cast on his early consideration of
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the equivalence of the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of psychology which
clarifies it to a great extent.
30 In fact, for both James and Russell there was a close relation between the theory of
knowledge  and  psychology.  Thus,  the  American  psychologist  writes:  “In  German
philosophy since Kant the word Erkenntnisstheorie, criticism of the faculty of knowledge,
plays  a  great  part.  Now  the  psychologist  necessarily  becomes  such  an
Erkenntnisstheoretiker” (James 1983: 184).  And Russell,  in turn, writes in his Theory of
Knowledge that “much of epistemology is included in psychology” and that, however, as
soon as the theory of judgment is reached, “a difficult and interesting problem of pure
logic arises, namely the problem of enlarging the inventor of logical forms so as to
include  forms  appropriate  to  the  facts  of  epistemology,”  so  concluding  “that  it  is
impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic
and psychology.”21
31 So, for a reader familiar with the thought of James and Russell, it should not be in the
least  surprising  that  Wittgenstein  considers  epistemology  and  philosophy  of
psychology  to  be  equivalent.  Yet,  if  we  reflect  a  little,  we  will  soon  come  to  the
conclusion that with this consideration of equivalence Wittgenstein is moving away
critically from Russell and perhaps even more from James.
 
III. The Psychologism Dispute: Philosophy and
Psychology
32 In fact, whereas James simply seems – later we shall see the reason for this cautious
formula – to identify the figures of the psychologist and the theorist of knowledge,
Russell  appears  to  conceive  of  the  theorist  of  knowledge  as  a  hybrid  being:  half
psychologist,  half  logician.  And  Wittgenstein?  Wittgenstein  identifies  the  theory  of
knowledge,  strictly,  with  the  philosophy  –  which  in  turn,  remember,  he  has  said
consists simply of logic and metaphysics – of psychology. That is to say that for him the
theory  of  knowledge  was  either  logic  or  metaphysics  of  psychology,  but  not
psychology!
33 Logic or metaphysics? If we put the architectural passage from the “Notes on Logic”
that we cited earlier in relation to the passage from Russell’s Theory of Knowledge that
we have just evoked, the dilemma seems to declare itself in favour of the former. We
must  remember that  Wittgenstein characterised philosophy as  “the doctrine of  the
logical form of scientific propositions,” whereas Russell, in turn, characterised as an
“interesting problem of pure logic […] the problem of enlarging the inventor of logical
forms so as to include forms appropriate to the facts of epistemology.” If we consider
them together, the most likely interpretation, as I understand it, of what Wittgenstein
means when he identifies the theory of knowledge with the philosophy of psychology is
that the former is a part of logic: the application of logic to psychological propositions.
34 We see, therefore, that James, Russell and Wittgenstein represent three different, but
continuous, conceptions of the theory of knowledge. James seems – we repeat: seems –
to identify the theory of knowledge with psychology, as Quine (1969) was to do over
half a century later in launching his proposal of the naturalisation of epistemology.
Russell considers the theory of knowledge as a hybrid discipline between psychology
and logic. Finally, Wittgenstein appears to understand the theory of knowledge as a
Psychologism and the Self
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
6
chapter of logic: the logic that deals with establishing the logical form of psychological
propositions. As a result of which, as we can now understand, he is able to define it as
the  philosophy  of  psychology  while  maintaining  that  philosophy  consists  only  of
metaphysics and logic.
35 And we can understand, too, that condensed in that identification that Wittgenstein
makes there is a criticism of the positions both of Russell and of James and, in general,
of all those who in one way or another, to a greater or lesser extent, have conceded that
philosophical  problems –  for  example,  epistemological  problems –  come within the
competence  of  psychology.  And  thus,  in  Tractatus 4.1121,  he  glosses  his  early
identification of the theory of knowledge with the philosophy of psychology in this
way:
Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science.
Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. Does not my study of sign-
language correspond to the study of thought-processes, which philosophers used to
consider  so  essential  to  the  philosophy  of  logic?  Only  in  most  cases  they  got
entangled  in  unessential  psychological  investigations,  and  with  my  method  too
there is an analogous risk. (Wittgenstein 2001: 4.1121)
36 This is how Wittgenstein intervened in the discussion that had arisen at the end of the
nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth about the respective competences
of philosophy and psychology: the “psychologism dispute” (Psychologismus-Streit); and
he did so from an even more radical anti-psychologist position than that of Russell
himself, defending that “Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any
other natural science” and that “the study of thought-processes, which philosophers
used  to  consider  so  essential,”  in  most  cases  proved  to  be  simply  “unessential
psychological investigations” (Wittgenstein 2011: 4.1121).
37 If  we were to seek an absolutely antithetical position to Wittgenstein’s,  perhaps we
might find it  in Brentano’s  book Psychology from an Empirical  Standpoint,  in the first
chapter of which – “The Concept and Purpose of Psychology” – the Austro-German
thinker  conceives  of  psychology,  which he describes  as  “the science of  the future”
(Brentano 1995: 19), as the basis of logic, aesthetics, ethics and even of politics;22 for
which reason it is called upon to play a decisive part in the progress of humanity, even
providing us with the means to neutralise cultural decadence.23
38 However,  although  James  knew  Brentano’s  work,  to  anyone  who  has  the  slightest
familiarity with his writings about Psychology it is evident that he did not share the
latter’s psychologistic enthusiasm. Yet did he not identify the figure of the psychologist
with that  of  the  epistemologist?  Did that  not  imply a  proposal  of  naturalisation of
epistemology and a form of psychologism?
39 In  my view,  the  answer to  these  questions  must  be  no,24 and that  is  why I  used a
prudent expression earlier when I outlined James’s position in contrast with those of
Russell and Wittgenstein. To see this we must return to the subject that we left pending
in the first section of this paper, about how James conceives of the relation between
Philosophy and Psychology.
In his 1892 essay “A plea for Psychology as a ‘natural science’,” James asks: “What is a
natural science, to begin with?” And he replies:
It is a mere fragment of truth broken out from the whole mass of it for the sake of
practical effectiveness exclusively. Divide et impera. Every special science, in order to
get at its own particulars at all, must make a number of convenient assumptions
and decline to be responsible for questions which the human mind will continue to
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ask about them […] Between the things thus assumed, now, the various sciences
find definite “laws” of sequence; and so are enabled to furnish general Philosophy
with materials properly shaped and simplified for her ulterior tasks. (James 1920:
317-8)
40 This  excellent  essay  in  a  way  condenses  the  understanding  that  James  has  of  the
relation that exists between philosophy and science, and therefore between philosophy
and psychology.  All  science presupposes a double limitation.  For a start,  that of  its
object of study, for any science begins by defining the boundaries, within the whole of
reality, of an area of phenomena whose laws are those that it proposes to investigate.
And then, that of its basic assumptions, the problematisation of which it renounces, at
least in so far as their practical efficacy – which James evaluates especially in terms of
their predictive ability25 – is maintained.
41 Now, even if science were to formulate some definitive principles to enable it to comply
perfectly with its practical objectives and adjust itself totally to our experience of the
world, something that is unthinkable for James in view of his dynamic understanding of
experience,26 the human mind would still continue wondering about these questions
that science renounces posing, and aspiring to a general,  and not just fragmentary,
view of reality.
42 Well, it is from this twofold aspiration that philosophy originates:
Metaphysics  means  only  an  unusually  obstinate  attempt  to  think  clearly  and
consistently. The special sciences all deal with data that are full of obscurity and
contradiction; but from the point of view of their limited purposes these defects
may be overlooked. Hence the disparaging use of the name metaphysics which is so
common. To a man with a limited purpose any discussion that is over-subtle for
that  purpose  is  branded as  “metaphysical”  […].  But  it  is  obvious  that  problems
irrelevant from one standpoint may be essential from another. And as soon as one’s
purpose is the attainment of the maximum of possible insight into the world as a
whole, the metaphysical puzzles become the most urgent ones of all. (James 1892b:
461-2)
43 We understand now how far James is from any simplistically positivist understanding
of  the  relation  between  science  and  philosophy,  or  of  any  radical  proposal  of
naturalisation of it. The development of science can never do away with philosophy,
nor can philosophy ever be reduced to a science.
44 But if James is not a reductive naturalist in metaphilosophical questions, then he can
also not be a supporter of psychologism, because, after all, psychologism is simply one
of the forms of this kind of reductionist naturalism. Precisely if psychology wishes to
aspire to become a natural science, it will have to share the limitations of the other
sciences with them, supplying materials to philosophy instead of supplanting them.
45 We now consider fully justified the caution that we showed earlier when we compared
James’s  position  with  those  of  Russell  and  Wittgenstein  concerning  the  relation
between psychology and epistemology. Resistant as he is to psychologism, James would
not  subscribe  to  Quine’s  proposal  of  reduction  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  to
psychology. In fact, the passage that we cited earlier in which he seems to identify the
psychologist with the epistemologist continues thus:
Now the psychologist necessarily becomes such an Erkenntnisstheoretiker.  But the
knowledge he theorizes about is not the bare function of knowledge which Kant
criticises  –  he  does  not  inquire  into  the  possibility  of  knowledge  überhaupt.  He
assumes it to be possible. (James 1983: 184)
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46 And in  case  it  is  not  clear,  in  the  following  chapter,  in  which  he deals  with  “The
Relations of Minds to Other Things,” he adds:
Now the relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world. If we ask
how one thing can know another we are led into the heart of Erkenntnisstheorie and
metaphysics.  The  psychologist,  for  his  part,  does  not  consider  the  matter  so
curiously as this. (James 1983: 212)
47 If, owing to their intentional character, mental states have a cognitive dimension, the
psychologist might well be considered the natural scientist Erkenntnisstheoretiker par
excellence. Taking for granted the cognitive validity of our mental states, he can ask
himself particular questions such as, to take a classic example, how it is possible that
we perceive the size of an object as constant despite the fact that it produces an ever
smaller  retinal  image  as  it  moves  away  from  us.  But  what  the  psychologist,  qua
psychologist, cannot and must not do – if he wishes to remain within the bounds of
natural science – is to ask himself about “the possibility of knowledge überhaupt,” i.e. in
general. This problem, the problem of whether one can know something in absolute
terms, is the central problem of epistemology or theory of knowledge, and as such it is
a strictly metaphysical problem.27
 
IV. The Psychologism Dispute: Psychology and Logic
48 Thus we might well say that James’s metaphilosophical position is as anti-psychologist
as that of the early Wittgenstein, except one would have to add that they are different
anti-psychologisms because, as we have seen, the young Wittgenstein considers that
the theory of knowledge is nothing but logic, and James considers that the theory of
knowledge is metaphysics.28
49 It is not really difficult to form an idea of what James might have thought of the first
Wittgenstein’s position if he had known it. Probably something very similar to what he
thought  about  Russell’s  manner  of  dealing  with  the  –  epistemologically  central  –
problem of truth, that it is a kind of innocuous “logical abstractionism.”29
50 Finding the logical form of psychological propositions – the task to which the young
Wittgenstein  seems to  reduce  the  theory  of  knowledge  –  is  still  a  form of  “logical
abstractionism”; and although, as we shall see later, that logical task that Wittgenstein
sets himself is not as innocuous as it might seem, the truth is that at this point it is
James who appears to be in the right. Logical abstractionism cannot give an account of
the central problems of the theory of knowledge.
51 And the fact is that, even if we bring to light the real logical form of psychological
propositions or any other propositions, scientific or ordinary, and even if we manage to
design a logical notation that avoids any confusion in this regard, there will always be
irreducibly metaphysical problems such as how it is possible that language describes
reality,  or  the  very  problem  of  the  truth  of  our  descriptions  of  it.  Problems  that
Wittgenstein  himself  could  not  avoid  facing  in  the  Tractatus,  which  may  perhaps
explain his warning, given, as we have seen, in the very paragraph in which he equated
the theory of knowledge with the philosophy of psychology, of the danger that his own
method might end up “entangled in unessential psychological investigations.”
52 Concerning  the  strategy  that  the  young  Wittgenstein  followed  to  try  to  avoid  this
danger, here we will only say two things. First: that it has an unquestionably Kantian
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aroma, in making the relation of thought and language with the world correspond to a
subject that is not empirical but transcendental. Second: that at some points, such as
his understanding of truth, his theses are not as compatible with James’s points of view
as they might seem to be at first sight.30
53 In  any  case,  the  psychologism  dispute  does  not  have  only  the  metaphilosophical
dimension,  concerning  the  relation  between epistemology  and  psychology,  that  we
have just considered. It also has another dimension that affects the philosophy of logic
more specifically. In this regard, psychologism can be understood as a concretion of the
empiricist conceptions that seek to make logic depend on a contingent order: of the
world, of our experience of it or of our particular mental structure. Can it be said that
in  this  restricted  sense  James  is  a  psychologist?31 Would  his  position  at  this  point
diverge from Wittgenstein’s?
54 The answers to these questions are not easy. In the last chapter of his Principles James
deals with the question of “Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience.” At the
beginning of the chapter he also distinguishes between necessary propositions – such
as “the opposite sides of a parallelogram are equal” – and contingent propositions –
such  as  “tomorrow  will  be  rainy.”  Concerning  the  latter  he  tells  us  that  they  are
something  that  “is  universally  admitted  to  be  due  to  ‘experience’”;  with  regard  to
necessary propositions he says that they are “ascribed to the ‘organic structure’ of the
mind,” and adds:
[t]his structure is in turn supposed by the so-called apriorists to be of transcendental
origin, or at any rate not to be explicable by experience; whilst by evolutionary
empiricists it is supposed to be also due to “experience,” only not to the experience
of the individual, but to that of his ancestors as far back as one may please to go.
(James 1983: 1215)
55 Which of  these  two options  is  the  one James  chooses?  He himself  replies:  “On the
whole, then, the account which the apriorists give of the facts is that which I defend;
although I should contend […] for a naturalistic view of their cause” (original emphasis).
That  is  to  say  that  James  opposes  any  empiricist  explanation  of  logical  and
mathematical truth. The necessary truths of which these disciplines are made up do
not  have  their  origin  in  experience,  whether  it  is  that  of  the  individual  or  of  the
species.
56 Since Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, explicitly defends the transcendental character of
logic – “Logic is transcendental,” we read in proposition 6.13 – it seems that we should
situate the Austrian philosopher in the same ranks of the “apriorists” in which James
includes  himself,  and  both,  in  turn,  on  the  side  of  the  anti-psychologism;  if  we
understand, as we have said, that psychologism is akin to the empiricist philosophies of
logic.
57 However, this conclusion is not as evident as it appears at first, or at least it requires
more than one qualification. For although it is quite clear that they both reject the
empiricist explanations of necessity of logic and mathematics, it is no less clear that
they seem to do so from different perspectives.  As we have just  seen,  Wittgenstein
assumes  a  philosophy  of  logic  of  a  transcendental  kind,  whereas  James  opts  for  a
markedly naturalist position. It seems, therefore, that here there is something similar
to  what  we  saw  earlier  with  regard  to  the  metaphilosophical  dimension  of
psychologism,  when  their  common  opposition to  the  reduction  of  the  theory  of
knowledge to psychology did not prevent the existence of profound differences in their
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respective understandings of epistemology. Except that now the comparison between
James’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies of logic is even more complex.
58 Indeed, for the young Wittgenstein logic is transcendental because of its function, since
in  his  opinion  respect  for  its  rules  is  the  sine  qua  non of  the  intelligibility  of  any
description that we may give of reality. Hence, in the same proposition of the Tractatus
in which he says that logic is transcendental (6.13), he notes that it “is not a body of
doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.” Thus the first Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
logic is functionally transcendental.
59 On  the  other  hand,  the  transcendentalism  that  James  opposes  is  a  genetic
transcendentalism.  It  is  the  position  that  in  philosophy  of  logic  attributes  a
transcendent origin to our a priori mathematical logic. In his essay on “Humanism and
Truth” to which we referred earlier he writes:
“God geometrizes,” it used to be said; and it was believed that Euclid’s elements
literally  reproduced  his  geometrizing.  There  is  an  eternal  and  unchangeable
“reason”; and its voice was supposed to reverberate in Barbara and Celarent. So
also  of  the  “laws  of  nature,”  physical  and  chemical,  so  of  natural  history
classifications – all were supposed to be exact and exclusive duplicates of prehuman
archetypes buried in the structure of things, to which the spark of divinity hidden
in our intellect enables us to penetrate. The anatomy of the world is logical, and its
logic is that of a university professor, it was thought. (James 1978: 40)
60 James opposes this genetic transcendentalism with his naturalism, according to which
the origin of  the a priori  structure of  our mind must be explained as the result  of
natural selection:
the  features  of  our  mental  structure  […]  must  be  understood  as  congenital
variations,  “accidental”  (in  the  Darwinian sense)  in  the  first  instance,  but  then
transmitted as fixed features of the race. (James 1983: 1216)32
61 The  question  that  must  be  asked  is  obvious:  is  Wittgenstein’s  functional
transcendentalism compatible  with  James’s  genetic  naturalism? And the  answer,  in
principle,  is  in the affirmative.  Except that  there is  a  difference in their  respective
conceptions of philosophy which would explain why the young Wittgenstein (and also
the later one, incidentally) would not have accepted James’s naturalism.
62 In paragraph 4.1122 of the Tractatus, as a gloss on what comes immediately before it
and  in  which,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  a  warning  against  metaphilosophical
psychologism, Wittgenstein says “Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy
than any other hypothesis in natural science”; a remark that might perfectly well have
been directed against  James’s  genetic  naturalism.  But  if  Wittgenstein would oppose
James’s theses it would be not so much because of their naturalism as for their genetic
character.  No  less  would  he  have  opposed  a  transcendentalism  that  shared  it.  In
Tractatus 3.031 we read: “It used to be said that God could create anything except what
would be contrary to the laws of logic.  The truth is that we could not say what an
‘illogical’ world would look like.”
63 The philosopher must abstain from formulating causal hypotheses, whether theological
or natural, about why we think as we do. In part, this is what Wittgenstein wanted to
indicate when, in his Notebooks, he wrote: “Logic must take care of itself.”33 If we are
asked why we think that the world is logical,  the only thing that we can offer as a
reason for it is that we could not think what an illogical world would be like. And the
fact is that Wittgenstein always maintained an extraordinarily austere conception of
philosophy, which he separated sharply from science,34 so philosophy had to remain
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within the limits of reasons and never enter the domain of causes. One of the perennial
motives for Wittgenstein’s reproaches of James, who had a much more tolerant – and in
my view, let me say, much more appropriate – understanding of philosophy, in which
there was room for causal considerations of a general nature.
64 So, although the functional transcendentalism of the first Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
logic  is,  in  principle,  not  incompatible  with  the  genetic  naturalism  of  James’s,  for
general  metaphilosophical  reasons  the  Austrian  thinker  would  have  rejected  it.
However, could the reciprocal statement be made with regard to James? Here, once
again, some explanation is required.
65 It is true that James’s genetic naturalism is, in principle, compatible with a Kantian
transcendental understanding of logic and mathematics, but the fact is that James finds
his inspiration not so much in the Königsberg philosopher as in the ideas that Locke
puts forward in his Essay:
I have done nothing more in the previous pages than to make a little more explicit
the teachings of Locke’s fourth book […] these eternal verities, these “agreements”
which the mind discovers by barely considering its own “fixed meanings” […]. None
of these eternal verities has anything to say about facts, about what is or not in the
world. (James 1983: 1256)
[N]ote the strange descent in Locke’s hands of the dignity of a priori propositions.
By  the  ancients  they  were  considered,  without  farther  question,  to  reveal  the
constitution of Reality. Archetypal things existed, it was assumed, in the relations
in which we had to think them. The mind’s necessities were a warrant for those of
Being […]. But the intuitive propositions of Locke leave us as regards outer reality
none the better for their possession. We still have to “go to our senses” to find what
reality is. The vindication of the intuitionist position is thus a barren victory. The
eternal verities which the very structure of our mind lays hold of do not necessarily
themselves lay hold on extra-mental being, nor have they, as Kant pretended later,
a legislating character even for all possible experience. (James 1983: 1258)
66 That is to say, James would be in agreement with the intuitive, a priori character of
mathematical and logical truths, but unlike the Kantian tradition – to which the first
Wittgenstein would undoubtedly subscribe – he would not consider that those truths
were a transcendental  condition of  all  possible experience,  or,  therefore,  that their
objective validity was guaranteed. What this means is  that for James,  if  we wish to
know whether the world responds to our a priori intuitions, there is no alternative but
to  turn  to  experience,  which  always  retains  its  potentiality  for  confutation.  It  is
precisely  this  potentiality  that  explains  the  rise  of  mathematical  and  even  logical
alternatives.35
67 Whether this pluralism, which James assumes in his essay on “Humanism and Truth,” is
compatible with the explanation that he gave in his Principles of the a priori structure
of our mind as the work of natural selection is a question on which we shall not express
an opinion here. What is clear, in my view, is that the second Wittgenstein would be
closer to this pluralism than the first one.
 
V. The Psychological Self
68 The  comparison  with  James’s  points  of  view  may  also  cast  light  on  the  first
Wittgenstein’s theses about the self; a very necessary light, given that the paragraphs
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of the Tractatus in which he deals with this question are undoubtedly among the most
obscure ones in the book.
69 Starting at paragraph 5.54, we read:
5.54 In the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only
as bases of truth-operations.
5.541 At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in
another  in  a  different  way.  Particularly  with  certain  forms  of  proposition  in
psychology, such as “A believes that p is the case” and “A has the thought p,” etc.
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in
some kind of relation to an object A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell,
Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)
5.542 It is clear, however, that “A believes that p,” “A has the thought p,” and “A
says p” are of the form “‘p’ says p”: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact
with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of
their objects.
5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul – the subject, etc. – as it
is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite
soul would no longer be a soul.
5.5422  The  correct  explanation  of  the  form  of  the  proposition,  “A  makes  the
judgement p,” must show that it  is  impossible for a judgement to be a piece of
nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to
one another in such and such a way. This no doubt also explains why there are two
possible ways of seeing the figure
 
Figure 1
as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (If I look
in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b’s, then the a’s
appear to be in front, and vice versa.)
70 Fundamentally, these considerations of Wittgenstein’s pose two hermeneutic problems:
how  would  his  analysis  of  psychological  propositions  overcome  the  principle  of
extensionality  –  “propositions  occur  in  other  propositions  only  as  bases  of  truth-
operations”? and what consequences does this analysis have for the conception of the
subject?  Here  I  will  say  nothing about  the  first  of  these  two questions36 and I  will
concentrate exclusively on the second.
71 In this respect, it is evident that Wittgenstein wishes to oppose the conception of the
subject that was initiated by the analysis of psychological propositions that appeared in
the “modern theory of knowledge,” with Russell and Moore counting as two of its most
distinguished representatives,37 and that, in short, actually coincided, in his view, with
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the understanding of the soul characteristic of the “superficial psychology” of the time.
But what was that conception?
72 At the time when he maintained the theory of judgement that Wittgenstein criticises in
the Tractatus Russell also assumed a Cartesian conception of the subject and of self-
knowledge.38 The self is a simple object to which we have direct cognitive access in the
psychological states that are self-representative. But Wittgenstein very soon realised
that his analysis of psychological propositions as a relation with a complex, with a fact,
implied that the subject of them could not be a simple object. And thus, in the Notes
dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway in the early days of April 1914, we find:
The relation of “I believe p” to “p” can be compared to the relation of “‘p’ says
(besagt) p” to p: it is just as impossible that I should be a simple as that “p” should
be. (Wittgenstein 1998: 119)
73 Thus  the  correct  analysis  of  the  logical  form  of  psychological  propositions  that
Wittgenstein proposes would amount to showing – a new amendment of Cartesianism –
that the subject of psychological attitudes cannot be a simple entity, a soul, but must be
a complex entity,  a set  of  mental  facts.  So it  is  quite plausible to suppose that,  for
Wittgenstein, psychology, as a natural science, would have the objective of determining
the causal laws that govern the succession of our mental states. Precisely in the way in
which James understood it.
74 And it is James himself, in The Principles of Psychology, who characterises the theory of
the soul in a way that may help us to contextualise and better understand what it is
that Wittgenstein was aiming at when he spoke of the “superficial psychology” of his
time. James says:
The theory of the Soul is the theory of popular philosophy and of scholasticism,
which is only popular philosophy made systematic. It declares that the principle of
individuality within us must be substantial,  for psychic phenomena are activities,
and there can be no activity without a concrete agent. This substantial agent cannot
be  the  brain  but  must  be  something  immaterial;  for  its  activity,  thought,  is
immaterial […]. Thought moreover is simple, whilst the activities of the brain are
compounded of the elementary activities of each of its parts. Furthermore, thought
is spontaneous or free, whilst all material activity is determined ab extra […]. For
these objective reasons the principle of psychic life must be both immaterial and
simple as well as substantial, must be what is called a Soul. The same consequence
follows from subjective reasons. Our consciousness of personal identity assures us
of our essential simplicity: the owner of the various constituents of the self […], the
hypothetical  Arch-Ego […] is  a  real  entity  of  whose existence self-consciousness
makes us directly aware […]. The Soul then exists as a simple spiritual substance in
which  the  various  psychic  faculties,  operations,  and  affections  inhere  […].  The
consequences of the simplicity and substantiality of the Soul are its incorruptibility
and natural immortality – nothing but God’s direct fiat can annihilate it – and its
responsibility at all times for whatever it may have ever done. (James 1983: 325-6;
original emphasis)
75 James does not invent this position. In the first book of his Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, to which we have already referred, Brentano assumes a conception of the
soul practically identical to the one that James presents, while to psychology, for him
the science of the future, as we already know, he attributes the additional advantage of
the very important teachings about immortality with which it provides us (Brentano
1995: 19-20).
76 What we have,  therefore, is  a further coincidence between James and Wittgenstein:
they both agree in opposing the Cartesian conception of the psychological subject, as
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they  had  previously  coincided  in  opposing  metaphilosophical  psychologism  and
psychologism as philosophy of logic. Yet once again this coincidence should not hide
their differences from us;  for a start,  methodological:  Wittgenstein has come to his
anti-Cartesian conclusion by means of the analysis of the logical forms of psychological
propositions;  whereas the path that  has  led James to  an identical  conclusion is  his
favourite  psychological  method:  introspection.  However,  above  all,  although
Wittgenstein and James agree in their theory of  the psychological  self,  they do not
agree, without further ado, in their theory of the self. For Wittgenstein, apart from the
self, one can still speak of a metaphysical subject, a philosophical self, which is the limit
of the world, not part of it:
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-
psychological way. What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that “the world
is my world.” The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body,
or  the  human  soul,  with  which  psychology  deals,  but  rather  the  metaphysical
subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it. (Wittgenstein 2001: 5.641)
77 By now we should be able to guess the reason for this discrepancy. At this point, too,
Wittgenstein is  drawn to a transcendental  focus with a Kantian affiliation,39 and he
considers that it is necessary to postulate the existence of a metaphysical subject that
accounts for the phenomenon of subjectivity,40 whereas James remains faithful to his
naturalism derived from Locke41 and does not consider that there is a need to postulate
any entity that, transcending the limits of experience, is at the same time a condition of
it:
Transcendentalism is only Substantialism grown shame-faced, and the Ego only a
‘cheap and nasty’ edition of the soul. All our reasons for preferring the “Thought”
to the “Soul” apply with redoubled force when the Soul is shrunk to this estate. The
Soul truly explained nothing […] but at least she had some semblance of nobility
and outlook […]. The Ego is simply nothing: as ineffectual and windy an abortion as
Philosophy can show.42
78 For James, “Thought” is already intrinsically subjective, and it is sufficient to analyse
the  relations  that  exist  between  its  different  states  –  basically,  of  continuity  and
similarity – to give a reliable account of “The consciousness of Self.”
 
VI. Conclusion
79 The comparison of some of the theses of the first Wittgenstein with those that James
maintained in his Principles shows the same complex pattern that other scholars have
detected when the point of reference taken for the comparison is the thought of the
second  Wittgenstein.  Their  relation  cannot  be  described  solely  as  “critical  and
negative.” As we have seen,  James and Wittgenstein coincide in their opposition to
metaphilosophical psychologism, to any attempt to reduce philosophy to a particular
science, whether it be psychology or any other, in the same way that they coincide in
their criticism of psychologism as philosophy of logic or of the Cartesian conception of
the  psychological  subject.  But  these  coincidences  should  not  make  us  ignore  their
profound differences. Their opposition to psychologism and to Cartesianism is made
from very different positions: that of an approach of a transcendental kind in the case
of the first Wittgenstein, and from a naturalist perspective in the case of James. The
fact that, as I understand it, from 1930 onwards Wittgenstein began to move towards
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more naturalist  positions would only indicate that  his  closeness to James gradually
increased with the years.
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NOTES
1. In the Nachlass, James’s name is mentioned 90 times. In the Philosophical Investigations James is
referred to as many times as Frege, and only less than St Augustine.
2. To use Boncompagni’s expression (2012b: 37).
3. See Wittgenstein (2012: 30, and 1981: 121). I devoted a paper, Sanfélix 2007, included as Ch. 1 in
Sanfélix 2017, to specifying the – tremendous – influence that this book had on Wittgenstein.
4. Monk (1991:  477).  For  a  brief  exposition of  Wittgenstein’s  relation with James’s  work,  see
Nubiola 2000.
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5. In the important Chapter VII of his Principles, “The Methods and Snares of Psychology,” James
recommends the use of three different methods for the construction of psychology as a “natural
science”:  “Introspective  Observation,”  “The  Experimental  Method”  and  “The  Comparative
Method.” Of these three methods, it will be evident to the unprejudiced reader that the one most
used by James in the writing of his book was, by far, the first, the introspective method, followed
by the comparative method. On Wittgenstein’s criticism of James’s conception of introspection,
Chauviré 2010 is worthwhile. Nevertheless, there have also been those who disagree that James
was “a classical  exponent of the tradition in the philosophy of mind that [Wittgenstein] was
opposing.” See Jackman 2006.
6. See also the “Preface” (James 1983: 6).
7. In any case, for this question, here and now I recommend a reading of Bordogna 2008 and
Padilla 2010. Apart from the Principles.
8. In the enumeration of “the sources of error in Psychology” that James makes in Chapter VII of
his Principles he indicates that “The first of them arises from the Misleading Influence of Speech” (James
1983: 193; original emphasis).
9. “The  reader  will  in  vain  seek  for  any  closed  system  in  the  book.  It  is  mainly  a  mess  of
descriptive details, running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her
task can hope successfully to deal with” (James 1983: 6-7).
10. Proceeding  from this  consideration,  one  has  only  to  apply  a  minimum of  interpretative
charity  to  understand  that  James  did  not  want  to  identify  or  reduce  the  self  to  any  set  of
“peculiar motions in the head and between the head and throat.” It is easy to understand the
aptness  of  the  title  of  the  chapter  that  Levin  (2002:  Ch.  7)  devotes  to  the  study  of  James’s
understanding of the self: “The Multiplicity of the Self.”
11. Only exceeded in length by Chapter XX, devoted to “The Perception of Space.”
12. To the works by Goodman, Boncompagni and Jackman to which we have already referred we
must add an ever longer list  of  authors who note their  coincidences in various matters.  For
example: once again Boncompagni 2012b; Quintanilla 2007; Sanfélix 2001, included in Sanfélix
2017 as Ch. 5; del Castillo 1995; and so on.
13. Wittgenstein (2012: 30; original emphasis).
14. Charles  Myers  was  the  lecturer  on  psychology  in  Cambridge,  author  of  A  Text-Book  of
Experimental  Psychology (1909),  who  directed  the  experiments  on  psychology  of  music  that
Wittgenstein conducted in 1912.
15. That year Russell published “Transatlantic Truth,” an article that was followed in 1909 by
“Pragmatism.” James responded to the objections contained in the first of these two works of
Russell’s in the same year, 1908, in his article “Two English Critics,” included the following year
as the final chapter of his book The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism (James 1909).
16. Included in Volume 7 of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell (Russell 1984).
17. Written in September 1913, just after returning from his first journey to Norway, during
which he had been accompanied by his friend David Pinsent. These notes, of which two different
versions are preserved, are included in the edition of his Notebooks 1914-16 (Wittgenstein 1998).
18. “Non-cognitive mental facts – feeling, emotion, volition” (Russell 1984: 22).
19. “It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself” is the fourth characteristic that
James attributes to thought in Chapter IX of his Principles, devoted to determining the nature of
“The Stream of Thought” (James 1983: 220).
20. See Russell (1984: 35).
21. Russell (1984: 46). 
22. “Let me point out merely in passing that psychology contains the roots of aesthetics, which,
in a more advanced stage of development, will undoubtedly sharpen the eye of the artist and
assure  his  progress.  Likewise,  suffice  it  to  say  that  the  important  art  of  logic,  a  single
improvement in which brings about a thousand advances in science, also has psychology as its
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source.  In addition,  psychology has the task of  becoming the scientific  basis  for  a  theory of
education,  both of  the individual  and of  society.  Along with aesthetics  and logic, ethics  and
politics also stem from the field of psychology. And so psychology appears to be the fundamental
condition  of  human  progress  in  precisely  those  things  which,  above  all,  constitute  human
dignity” (Brentano 1995: 15-6).
23. “Perhaps it alone will be in a position to provide us the means to counteract the decadence
which sadly interrupts the otherwise steadily ascending cultural development from time to time”
(Brentano 1995: 16).
24. Counter to the more usual readings that generally attribute some form of psychologism to
James. See Kuklick 1977; Dilworth 2011; and even Bordogna 2008.
25. “In our dealings with natural phenomena the great point is to be able to foretell,” James
wrote later in his essay “Humanism and Truth” James (1978: 51).
26. The same essay on “Humanism and Truth” abounds in declarations such as: “Experience is a
process that continually gives us new material to digest” or “The fundamental fact about our
experience is that it is a process of change” (James 1978: 42, and 54).
27. See James (1920: 318).
28. If,  however,  by  metaphysics  we  understand,  as  James  did,  only  “an  unusually  obstinate
attempt to think clearly and consistently,” then we would have to say that the anti-psychologism
of the second Wittgenstein would be very close to that of James himself.
29. See James (1978: 152).
30. I  enlarged  on  the  aspects  of  the  metaphysics  of  the  Tractatus that  are  compatible  with
pragmatism, especially James’s, in Sanfélix 2001.
31. On this matter there is an enlightening essay by Klein 2016.
32. On James’s darwinisn, see Calcaterra 2015.
33. Wittgenstein (1998: 22.8.14). See also Wittgenstein (2001: 5.473).
34. “It  was  correct  that  our  considerations  must  not  be  scientific  ones”  (Wittgenstein  2009:
§ 109).
35. See James (1978: 40). 
36. I devoted Sanfélix 2008 to this theme.
37. Since Wittgenstein mentions Russell’s  theory of judgement,  it  is  very likely that in these
paragraphs he was thinking of the essays that Russell devoted to this question, such as “On the
Nature of Truth and Falsehood,” contained in his volume of Philosophical Essays, in which there
are also some of his essays on James and pragmatism, Russell  1910.  As for Moore, it  is  most
probable that Wittgenstein had in mind the talk that he gave in the Aristotelian Society in 1910,
“The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception,” (Moore 1922), of which he asked Russell to
send two copies to him in Norway in October 1913. See Wittgenstein (2012: 49).
38. Although  in  his  ill-fated  Theory  of  Knowledge of  1913  he  had  already  begun  to  express
reservations and he soon ended up by retracting from it.
39. But at this point basically passed through the sieve of Schopenhauer.
40. See Sluga (1996: 329). Incidentally, Sluga is one of the few authors who considers it plausible
that at some point in his treatment of the question of the self the first Wittgenstein may have
been inspired by James’s Principles. See Sluga (1996: 352n11). Obviously, I agree with him.
41. Although I would say that at this point it was passed through the sieve of Hume, and this
despite James’s criticisms of the associationist tradition to which the Scottish thinker subscribed.
42. James (1983: 345; original emphasis). The curious thing is that Wittgenstein could be fairly in
agreement  with  this  diagnosis  of  James’s:  “Here  it  can  be  seen  that  solipsism,  when  its
implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks
to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it” (Wittgenstein
2001: 5.64).
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ABSTRACTS
Although it is not documentarily proven, it is not unlikely that the young Wittgenstein read at
least part of William James’s psychological work. In this paper we have compared their respective
points of view about psychologism and the conception of the self. The result is a complex pattern
of similarities and differences. If James and the early Wittgenstein coincide in their opposition to
psychologism  and  the  Cartesian  conception  of  the  subject,  they  do  so  from  very  different
philosophical positions: that of a naturalist focus in the case of the American thinker; that of a
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